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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 7177

!VELLA HUTCHISON,
Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is a companion to Case No. 7176, State of
Utah vs. HowardS. Byington. Upon stipulation of counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, an order was
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entered by the Chief Justice, permitting consolidation of
the cases for argument before this Court.
The Appellant, I vella Hutchison, having been tried
before the District Court of the First Judicial District,
County of Cache, State of Utah, was found guilty by
verdict of jury of Perjury in Second Degree, fined
$250.00 and sentenced to 90 days in the county jail,-the
sentence to be suspended upon payment of the fine. Appellant has requested that this Honorable Court set
aside the verdict and sentence and that the fine be refunded to her.
Under Section 103-43-1.10 U.C.A. 1943, it is provided
in part:
"A. person is guilty of perjury who (1)
Swears ***that he will testify ***in or in connection with, any action ***in which an oath is required by law ***and who in such action, ***willfully and knowingly testifies, ***any matter to
be true which he knows to he false.''
Section 103-43-10 U.C.A. 1943 reads in part as follows:
''A person is guilty of perjury in the first
degree who commits perjury as to any material
matter in or in connection with any action or
special proeeding, ***. ''
Perjury in the second degree is designated by the
Legislature, in Section 103-43-11, as follows:
A person is guilty of perjury in the second
r1egree who commits perjury under circumstances
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not amounting to perjury in the first degree.''
The record discloses, by State's exhibit "C ", that
a Decree of Divorce was entered on the 9th day of May,
1947, absolving the bonds of matrimony existing between
one Howard S. Byington and one Lavina Byington; and
that by the provisions of the Decree, Mrs. Byington was
awarded custody of the four children of the partie~s and
$50.00 per month for their support and maintenance,
payable on the 20th day of l\fay 1947 and each month
thereafter. A further sum of $1.00 per year was awarded
to Lavina Byington as alimony, payable June 1, 1947
and annually thereafter.
State's exhibit "C" further reflects that on or
about the 26th of November 1947, Lavina Byington filed
an affidavit in which she set forth as a fact, the failure
of Howard S. Byington to make the payments as ordered
and further that "His failure to pay said sums has been
willful and intentional.'' Lavina Byington, in the aforesaid affidavit prayer that the Court enter an order
directing him to show cause why he should not he punished for contempt for failure to make the aforesaid
payments. The order was issued by the Court on or
about the 26th day of November 1947 and was regularly
heard by the Court on the 8th day of December. At the
hearing Lavina Byington appeared personally and wa;s
represented by her counsel. Howard S. Byington appeared without counsel. The Court heard the testimony
of Lavina Byington as to her information concerning
Howard S. Byington's income since the entry of the
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decree. Byington also was questioned at that time by
counsel for Mrs. Byington and by the Court in respect
to his earnings and failure to pay alimony.
It wa;s during the course of these proceedings on the
Order to Show Cause that Byington, among other things,
was questioned as to whether or not he had remarried.
Byington answered ''yes.'' He further testified that he
was married in the state of :Jiontana but that he did not
know of the exact time or place. His recollection concerning the marriage was so hazy that the Court a'S ked :
"Where is your wife 1"
Answer: ''Home.''
Court : ''Hasn't she been able to tell you
wJiere you got marri·ed 1''
Answer: ''Well, I guess she could.''
Court: "Then I'm going to give you just
about five minutes to get down thre, Mr. Byington,
and bring her back her·e. We 'II take a recess for
about ten minutes so far as this case is concerned,
and you may go with the Sheriff and bring her
back.''
(Page 56, State's Exhibit "B")
Byington returned to Court with the Appellant who
when called to the stand testified as follows:

"Q What's your

name~

A !vella Hutchison.

Q Will you say that

again~

A !vella Hutchison.
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Q How do you spell it 1 I-v-e-1-l-a 1
A Yes.

Q Hutchison'?
~\

Yes.

Q Don't you go by the nan1e of Byington?
A

Yes.

Q How long have you been going by that
name'
A "\Yell, I've been going by it, too, for the
last month.
Q You've been what'
:A Going by it definitely for the last month.

Q Well, how long-A But we weren't married until the first
of December.

Q How long did you go by it indefinitely'
A Since last October.

Q When were you married?
A First of this month.

Q

Where~

A Montana

Q What¥
A Montana.

Q Where at in Montana¥
A

Can't tell you.

Q Have you got a marriage

license~
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A Did have, yes
Q Where is it~
A. It is either in my personal belongings at
my mother's home or somewhere between Buel
Idaho, and Blackfoot and here.''
'
Based upon the foregoing testimony, the Appellant
was charged and convicted of the crime of perjury in the
Rrrond degree.
PROPOSITION NO. 1
THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING MARRIAGE
\VERE PROPER AND PERTINENT TO THE
COURT.
As set forth in Proposition No. 1 of the Respondent's Brief, Case No. 7176, it is the Respondent's po·sition that questions to Byington concerning his marriage
were relevant to the final determination and disposition
of the case then before the Court. Counsel for Appellant
argues that testimony concerning marriage was irregularly received and immaterial to the issues and that the
only -reason that could be given for the Appellant to
testify was either "to have her perjure herself or incriminate herself." There is nothing in the record to
support this contention or such a premise. Byington testified that he was married to the Appellant but was very
vagu.e concerning the time or place of the marriage and
it was the suggestion of the Court that he return with
Appellant in order that his m·emory in these particulars
could be refreshed. When Appellant was asked to take
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the stand and questioned concerning her 1narriage with
there was no reason for the Court to believe
BYI.ncion
•
0
'
that she would falsify. It would appear to be Counsel's
position that the Court had every reason to believe Appellant to be Byington's wife; that she could not be compelled to testify against her husband; and therefore
that she should not be called as a witness. On the other
hand, the Appellant claims the Court compelled her to
perjure herself because he had every reason to believe
her not to be the wife of Byington. Such arguments are
not consistent.
In 48 C.J. 864, the following appears:
''A privileged witness, such as a defendant in
a criminal trial or a person whose testimony may
tend to incriminate him may be prosecuted for
perjury or false swearing if he waives his privilege and testifies falsely. A fortiori, where there
is no privilege, the witness cannot escape liability
for false testimony. But, if he has the privilege
and does not waive it but testifies because illegally
compelled to do so, he is not liable for perjury s·o
committed.''
PROPOSITION NO. 2
THE STATE11ENTS INVOLVED WERE VOLUNTARILYMADE
Appellant urges in her brief that the question of
marriage was incriminating and in violation of the protection afforded a witnes·s under Article 1, Section 12 of
the Constitution of the State of Utah, and 8ection
105-1-10 Utah Code Annotated 1943.
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Therefore, could it not be well argued that had
I vella Hutchison told the truth before the Court, and a
prosecution for the acts revealed by heT testimony was
thereafter instituted, she would be immune from such
prosecution by establishing that the matter originated
through testimony and evidence she was compelled to
produce by order of Court.
As far as the Appellant is concerned there can be
no question that the provjsions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, to the effect that ''the accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against self," is not pertinent
to this matter. !vella Hutchison was not accused of a
crim·e. She was called as a witness to testify in civil
proceedings pending before the Court.
The determ1nation as to whether or not the questions
were self-incriminating presupposes a further proposition of law that in the event !vella Hutchison had truthfully answered the questions submitted she would subject
herself to criminal prosecution. It may be that it could
be well argued that a truthful answer to the questions
would have been an assurance of immunity from prosecution.
There is a line of well accepted authority to the
effect that a person who is brought into Court under subpoena or otherwise and co~pelled to testify on subjects
which may prove self-incriminating, has thereby gained
immunity from prosecution concerning such matters.
In the case of Peop1e vs. Schwarz, 248 Pac. 990, 78
Cal App. 561, the following was stated:
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''The weight of authority clearly supports
the proposition that one who is brought into court
under a subpoena and testifies pursuant the·reto
acts under con1pulsion. In People Y~. Courtney,
94 N.Y. 490, 493, it was said, 'The Constitution
primarily refers to c01npulsion exercised through
the process of the courts,' and not to the supposed n10ral coercion which impels a person to
testify lest adverse inferences might be drawn
from his silence. In Boyd vs. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746, it was said:
'Constitutional provisions for the security of persons and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficasy,
and leads to gradual depreciation of the
right, as if it consisted more in sound than
in substance. It is the duty of courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta
principiis.'
"And in United States vs. Kallas (D.C.) 272
F. 742-752, it was said, further:
'How can it be said that, if a court required an accused to answer upon the witness
chair, with the alternative of going to jail
if he refused, it was such compulsion as to
invalidate the evidence so obtained, and, at
the same time, that a prisoner questioned in
jail by his captor was not compelled to give
evidence against himself.'
.
'Sue~ a co~rse would be to very nearly,
If not quite, blind oneself as to what constitutes compulsion. As above pointed out the
compulsion forbidden by the amendmen.'t--or
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at least included in its prohibition--is compulsion exercised through the process of the
court. The eommitment by which the petitioner in the present case was held in jail is
no less a compelling process than were he in
court and ordered upon the witness chair for
examination. ***While it may be that manv
know of their rights, and, even when i~
prison, have the will and courage to stand
upon them, there certainly are others who do
not.'
"In Re Simon, 297 F. 942, 34 A.L.R. 140-1, it
was contended that a bankrupt who had failed to
obey a subpoena was not guilty of having violated
an order of court. But it was said by the Circuit
Court of Appeals:
'It cannot be denied, however, that a
subpoena is a writ. ***It will not be denied
that a writ is a mandatory precept issued
by a eourt. Commanding the person to whom
it is addressed to do or refrain from doing
some act therein specified. Because it is mandatory, and is issued by a court, it is an order
of the court. ***The time was when a witness
could not be compelled to go to court and
testify, and if he attended and gave testimony
his action was thought .to bear the semblance
of n1aintenance, and he ran the risk, if he
came forward to testify, of being afterwards
sued for maintenance by the party against
whom he had spoken. *** A subpoena is a
writ or process, and is mandatory in its
nature, being a positive command. A writ of
subpoena, like a writ of scire facias, fieri
facias, habeas corpus, certiorari, supersedeas, and the various other writs, 'are all
commands or orders of court that something
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be done.' ••• In Burns vs. Superior Com~t,
140 Cal. 1, 3, 7~~. P. 597. 598, the court sa1d
that the very etymology of the word 't-'U bpoena' signifies ·an order with a penaltY
for disobedience.' In the case of Scott V8.
Shields, 8 Cal. App. 12, 96 P. 385, a subpoena
is said to be: ''A writ or order directed to a
person and requiring his attendance at a
particular time and place to testify as a
witness.' ''
''The California cases cited in the foregoing
quotation involved questions of certiorari and contempt, and therefore are dissimilar from the one
here presented. But they are in harmony with the
consensus of general authorities that a subpoena
is a writ, an order, for the disobedience of which
the person named therein may be punished ac.:
cording to the expressed will of the Legislature.
"It has been suggested that the benefit of
the immunity clause is not availab~e to these
defendants because they failed to 'claim the privilege.' It is obvious, however, that under such
statutes there is no privilege. In Bradley v.
Clark, 133 Cal. 196, 65 P. 395, the Supreme Court
construed an identical provision in the Purity of
Elections Law (St. 1893, p. 12). It was there said:
'If the matter sought to be elicted by the
questions was matter embraced within the
purview of any of the sections ***and if, with
the defendant as a 'person offending,' the
witnes·s himself was also a 'person offending,' then by the express provisions of section
32, and by the authority of this court. in Ex
parte Cohen, 104 Cal. 524, 43 Am. St. Rep.
127, the witness could not claim immunity,
and should not have compelled to testify.'
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"We think, therefore, that the appellants
Frankfort and Goldner were 'compelled to testify
under oath' concerning the acts, transactions,
matters, and things constituting the offense alleged in the indictment herein, and that by the
express inhibitions of the statute they were thus
guaranteed immunity from prosecution therefor. For the reasons stated, the judgments, as to
these two appellants, must be reversed."
The simple fact remains that Appellant falsified
under oath. How and in what manner she \Vas brought
into Court as a witness is wholly immaterial to the issues.
14 Am. Juris. 371, par. 171, discusses the "inherent
powers of courts.'' The text states that these powers are
such as result from the very nature of its organization
and are essential to its existence and protection and to
the due administration of justice. Among the powers
discussed therein, the following appears:
''Another illustration of the inherent powers
of courts is the power to administer oaths in the
trial of cases. This power is implied in the
jurisidction to try cases and to receive the testimony of witnesses under oath, and it need not be
conferred by statute. The power to maintain
order, to secure the attendance of witnesses, to
the end that the rights of the parties may be ascertained, and to enforce process to the end that
effect may be given to judgments must inhere in
every court or the purpose of its creation fails.
Without such power no other could be exercised."
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PROPOSITION NO. 3
TRIAL JUDGE 'VAS NOT DISQUALIFIED
According to the record, as set forth in Appellant's
Brief, prior to the trial of this case, attorney for Appellant filed application and petition for a change of judge
upon the affidavit of api>ellant to the effect that the presiding judge, before whom the action was pending, was
prejudiced against her and that she believed said judge
would not grant her a fair and impartial trial.
It is respectfully submitted that this is the only indication of record that there was any doubt ·concerningl
the ability of the Court to hear the matter fairly. The
affidavit, which at the most states a conclusion of appellant, is the only evidence that the judge was either
biased or prejudiced.
A review of the record and pages 3 to 15 of the
transcript disclosed that in the selection of the jury the
court absolutely insured that !vella Hutchinson would
be afforded a fair trial. Nowhere in the proceedings does
it appear that this attitude changed during the course of
the trial. This Court has repeatedly held that the motion
seeking to disqualify a trial judge on the ground of bias
and prejudice is addressed to the discretion of the judge
and he must decide the motion the same as any other
matter which comes before him. Musser vs. Third Judicial District Court, 106 Utah 373, 148 Pac. (2d) 802. An
affidavit stating that the judge is biased and prejudiced
does not show disqualification. Cox vs. Dixie Packing Co.,
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72 Utah 23·6, 269 Pac. 1000. See also Haslam vs. Morrison, ______ Utah------, 190 Pac. (2d) 520 and Willie vs. Local
Realty Co., ______ Utah (April 28, 1948).
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Appellant was
found guilty upon evidence which conclusively establishes
her guilt. To say that the manner in which she was
brought into Court exonerates or condones her delinquency as a matter of law, would be a travail upon Justice. The verdict and the sentence below must stand.

GROVER A. GILES,

Attorney Gener.al of Utah
ANDREW JOHN BRENNAN,

Assistant AUo·rney General
Att,orneys fo·r Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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